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5 Monetary Policy in the Great 
Depression and Beyond
The Sources of the Fed's Inflation Bias
David C. Wheelock 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced his "New Eco 
nomic Policy." Nixon's plan included two features that reflected on the 
state of American monetary policy. First, to combat inflation, Nixon 
imposed wage and price controls; and, second, in response to Amer 
ica's long-running and worsening international payments deficit, 
Nixon suspended convertibility of the dollar into gold. Both policies 
were intended to be temporary. Wage and price controls were tempo 
rary, but the gold window appears to be permanently shut, and the dol 
lar has floated against other currencies since 1973.
The imposition of wage and price controls and suspension of dollar 
convertibility reflected the failure of U.S. monetary policy to control 
inflation under the prevailing international monetary regime—the Bret- 
ton Woods System. Although Bretton Woods was at its heart a gold 
standard, it did not impose the same level of discipline on monetary 
policy that the pre-war gold standard had. Under the classical gold 
standard, market-driven gold outflows would limit inflationary money 
supply growth and provide long-run price stability. Bretton Woods was 
a gold standard managed by central banks, however, and with central 
bank cooperation a country could run a long-term payments deficit if 
other countries were willing to hold its currency. The Bretton Woods 
System ultimately collapsed because other countries became unwilling 
to hold dollars and because the United States was unwilling to impose 
a monetary policy on itself that would ensure convertibility of dollars 
into gold.
The United States had confronted a similar choice before. In 1931, 
uncertainty about the ability or willingness of the United States to 
remain on the gold standard precipitated gold outflows that forced
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American monetary authorities to make a decision. They could choose 
to defend their gold reserve by tightening monetary policy or they 
could suspend convertibility of the dollar into gold. In the midst of the 
Great Depression, Federal Reserve officials understood that a tighter 
monetary policy might worsen the downturn, but to preserve the gold 
standard they chose to raise interest rates and allow a contraction of 
bank reserves.
In this paper, I argue that American officials chose to abandon gold 
in 1971 because of institutional and ideological changes brought about 
by the Great Depression. Key changes included a new avenue for 
monetizing federal government debt, a weakening of the Federal 
Reserve System's insulation from political interference, and a new eco 
nomic policy ideology that doubted the stability of private markets and 
prescribed government management of aggregate demand.
The most important change for monetary policy stemming from 
the Great Depression concerned the gold standard. In 1931, Federal 
Reserve officials viewed the gold standard as fundamental to long-run 
economic prosperity and were willing to defend the system even if it 
meant taking actions that would worsen the ongoing Depression. In 
1971, U.S. economic policymakers no longer viewed the gold standard 
in this way and were unwilling to tighten monetary policy to preserve 
the gold standard, even though the United States had a rising rate of 
inflation and a growing economy. The choice to abandon Bretton 
Woods was made, I argue, because the Great Depression had weakened 
the ideological underpinnings of the gold standard. 1
During the Depression, the gold standard had failed to preserve 
prosperity for those countries with even the largest reserve holdings, 
and suspension proved to be a prerequisite for recovery in most coun 
tries (Eichengreen and Sachs 1985). Although many people continued 
to view the gold standard and fixed exchange rates positively, most 
believed that the gold standard required the management of govern 
ment officials. Thus, after World War II, the managed gold standard of 
Bretton Woods supplanted the pre-war gold standard. Under Bretton 
Woods, the United States was able to run an inflationary monetary pol 
icy without the swift discipline of gold outflows. The initial impetus 
for inflation resulted from other changes—increased political pressure 
on the Fed and attempts to stimulate output by increasing aggregate 
demand, for example, as well as from flaws in the Fed's basic operat-
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ing strategy. But under Bretton Woods, inflation could gather substan 
tial momentum before policymakers were forced to confront the 
consequences of their policies. In the face of a hemorrhaging balance 
of payments deficit and no strong ideological attachment to gold, Bret 
ton Woods collapsed and external constraints on domestic monetary 
policy were abandoned.
This paper begins with an overview of monetary policy during the 
Great Depression. By many (though not all) possible measures, mone 
tary policy was exceptionally contractionary during 1929-1933, and I 
examine why the Fed pursued such a policy during this period. Next, I 
identify and discuss key institutional changes to the monetary policy 
environment that resulted directly from the Great Depression. I argue 
that these changes help explain the inflation bias of the Fed's post- 
World War II monetary policy. Finally, I describe the Federal 
Reserve's response, or lack thereof, to the growing balance of pay 
ments deficits leading up to the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971, and 
how the decision to abandon gold in 1971 was a legacy of the Great 
Depression.
MONETARY POLICY IN THE FIRST PHASE 
OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION
By almost any measure, monetary policy during the period 1929— 
1933 was a disaster: the money supply and price level both fell by one- 
third, ex post real interest rates reached double digits, and banks failed 
by the thousands (Table 1). How could the Fed have let this happen?
The explanations for the Fed's disastrous monetary policy during 
the Great Depression largely fall into two categories. One attributes 
policy failures to innocent mistakes or neglect, while the other con 
tends that the Fed willfully engineered contractionary monetary policy 
to foster bureaucratic objectives, or in response to interest group pres 
sure. Although some political scientists and public choice economists 
favor the latter explanation (e.g., Epstein and Ferguson 1984; Ander- 
son, Shughart, and Tollison 1988), most economists and economic his 
torians blame the Fed's policy on misguided policy rules, as well as on







































































































































































































































































































































































NOTE: The value in each "% change" column refers to year-to-year differences in the logs of the series to the left.
a $ billions (Historical Statistics 1960, Fl).
b $ billions, 1929 prices (Historical Statistics 1960, F3).
c 1947-1949 = 100 (Historical Statistics 1960, El 13).
d $ millions, June figure (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Appendix Al).
e $ millions, June figure (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Appendix Al).
f Suspended banks (Board of Governors 1943, p. 283).
g Deposits in suspended banks, $ thousands (Board of Governors 1943, p. 283).
h Yearly average yield on 3-6 month Treasury notes and certificates (1919-1933) and bills (1934-1941)
(Board of Governors 1943, p. 460). 
1 Short-term government yield less CPI inflation rate in same year.
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petty jealousies that limited the Fed's ability to respond decisively to 
rapidly changing conditions.
The most prominent explanation of Federal Reserve behavior dur 
ing the Great Depression is that of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), who 
argue that a distinct shift in policy occurred with the death in 1928 of 
Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Like Fisher (1935) before them, Friedman and Schwartz contend that 
Strong understood how to employ the tools of monetary policy to min 
imize cyclical fluctuations in output and prices and to prevent or limit 
financial panics. His death created a void of both leadership and 
understanding that left the Fed unresponsive to financial crises, bank 
runs, and their contractionary effects.
Under Strong's leadership, the Fed had used the tools at its dis 
posal to pursue both domestic and international objectives (Wheelock 
1991). Large open-market purchases and discount rate reductions in 
1924 and 1927 were apparent attempts both to encourage domestic 
economic growth and to enable Great Britain to attract gold reserves 
(by lowering U.S. interest rates relative to those in Britain). Open-mar 
ket sales and discount rate hikes in 1928-1929, on the other hand, were 
intended to discourage stock market speculation, which at least some 
Fed officials viewed as a manifestation of inflation.
On the surface, the Fed seems to have been less responsive to the 
Depression than it had been to earlier, smaller, cyclical downturns. 
Table 2 presents a rough comparison of Federal Reserve actions during 
the initial phase of the Great Depression (1929-1931) with Fed actions 
during the recessions of 1924 and 1927. The Fed's Index of Industrial 
Production serves as a measure of economic activity. The index 
declined approximately 20 points from the cyclical peak in April 1923 
to the trough in July 1924. The recession of 1927 was considerably 
more modest—the index declined 11 points from October 1926 to 
October 1927. By contrast, the Index of Industrial Production declined 
by 42 points between July 1929 and July 1931 and by another 9 points 
from July 1931 to October 1931. In terms of the Fed's basic policy 
tools—the discount rate and open-market purchases of government 
securities—the Fed was much less vigorous in 1929-1931 than it had 
been in response to the smaller recessions of 1924 and 1927. This fact, 
along with the occurrence of banking panics and sharp declines in the 
money stock and price level during 1929-1931, lead Friedman and
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SOURCE: Board of Governors (1937), pp. 175-177 for IP, and Board of Governors 
(1943), pp. 370-371 for GS and DL, pp. 440-441 for DR, pp. 450-451 for /, and p. 400 
forDL(NYC). 
Definitions:
IP: Index of Industrial Production (seasonally adjusted) 
GS: Federal Reserve System's holdings of government securities (in $ mil 
lions) 
DR: discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (in %)
i: commercial paper interest rate (in %) 
DL: borrowed reserves of Fed member banks (in $ millions) 
DL (NYC): borrowed reserves of New York City Fed member banks (in $ millions)
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Schwartz (1963) to conclude that the intent and implementation of 
monetary policy during the Great Depression were dramatically differ 
ent from what they had been in 1924 and 1927. 2
Despite the Fed's weak response to the Depression, some research 
ers argue that policy changed little, if at all, with Benjamin Strong's 
death (e.g., Wicker 1966; Brunner and Meltzer 1968; Wheelock 1991). 
During the Depression, the Fed used borrowed reserves (discount-win 
dow loans) and market interest rates as policy guides. 3 When member 
banks borrowed relatively little from the Federal Reserve discount win 
dow or market interest rates were unusually low, Fed officials inter 
preted monetary conditions as "easy." Conversely, high levels of 
borrowed reserves or high interest rates signaled that money was 
"tight." Once the Depression began, both borrowed reserves and inter 
est rates fell sharply and generally remained low, giving Fed officials 
the impression that money was plentiful and "cheap."
The Fed's use of discount-window borrowing and interest rates as 
policy guides during the Depression appears consistent with the policy 
framework that Benjamin Strong had outlined when he was running 
the Fed. Speaking to Federal Reserve officials in 1926, for example, 
Strong described his rule of thumb for determining how to use open- 
market policy during a recession:
Should we go into a business recession while the member 
banks were continuing to borrow directly 500 or 600 million 
dollars ... we should consider taking steps to relieve some of 
the pressure which this borrowing induces by purchasing gov 
ernment securities and thus enabling member banks to reduce 
their indebtedness . . .
As a guide to the timing and extent of any [open-market] pur 
chases which might appear desirable, one of our best guides 
would be the amount of borrowing by member banks in princi 
pal centers . . . Our experience has shown that when New York 
City banks are borrowing in the neighborhood of 100 million 
dollars or more, there is then some real pressure for reducing 
loans, and money rates tend to be markedly higher than the dis 
count rate . . . When member banks are owing us about 50 mil 
lion dollars or less the situation appears to be comfortable, with 
no marked pressure for liquidation, (quoted by Chandler 1958, 
pp. 239-240)
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By Strong's guidelines, additional open-market purchases were not 
called for in 1929-1931. The borrowed reserves (discount loans) of all 
Fed member banks as well as those of New York City banks declined 
far below their levels of 1924 and 1927 (Table 2). Similarly, money 
market interest rates were unusually low in 1930-1931. Thus, by 
Strong's measures, the stance of monetary policy in 1930-1931 
appears to have been quite easy. Policymakers inferred that there was 
little more the Fed could, or should, do, and that it was now up to the 
economy to respond. As Strong (1926, p. 468) had said on another 
occasion, "The Reserve Banks do not push credit into use" (emphasis 
in original).
Many economists have noted that rigid use of borrowed reserves or 
interest rates as policy instruments will cause the money supply to rise 
and fall procyclically because borrowed reserves and interest rates tend 
to vary positively with economic activity. Moreover, the banking cri 
ses of 1929-1933 made borrowed reserves an especially poor indicator 
of monetary conditions during the Depression because a fear of runs 
made banks especially reluctant to suggest any weakness to depositors, 
which discount-window borrowing might do (Wheelock 1991). 
Although a few System officials questioned the reliability of borrowed 
reserves as a policy guide during the Depression, the prevailing view 
was that monetary conditions were exceptionally easy and that the 
economy's failure to expand was not the fault of monetary policy. We 
cannot say for certain whether monetary policy would have been dif 
ferent during 1929-1931 had Benjamin Strong lived, but it does seem 
to have been consistent with Strong's response to business cycle down 
turns in 1924 and 1927 and the guidelines for assessing the stance of 
monetary policy he had outlined.
THE GOLD CRISIS OF 1931
Federal Reserve policy during the initial phase of the Great 
Depression—from the stock market crash in October 1929 through 
September 1931—was largely predictable from the policy guidelines 
followed by Benjamin Strong during the 1920s. But interest rates and 
discount-window borrowing shot up dramatically in the fourth week of
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September 1931 and remained high until early 1932. During this 
period, the Fed raised its discount rate but failed to make significant 
open-market purchases, even though the Depression was getting worse 
and monetary conditions were exceptionally restrictive.
The year 1931 was marked by a series of financial crises that led to 
suspension of the gold standard by a number of European countries, 
culminating with Great Britain on September 21. Following Britain's 
departure from gold, speculation that the United States would soon fol 
low triggered a massive gold outflow from the United States and atten 
dant decline in commercial bank reserves. The Federal Reserve acted 
to stem the outflow by raising its discount rate—the classic defense— 
but did not use open-market operations to replace the outflow of com 
mercial bank reserves.
In the six weeks ending October 28, 1931, the monetary gold stock 
of the United States declined by $727 million, or some 15 percent. At 
this point, the gold stock stabilized, but uncertainty about the condition 
of American banks caused bank customers to redeem their deposits for 
currency. Between mid September and the end of December, currency 
held by the public rose $544 million (11 percent). Banks borrowed 
heavily from the Federal Reserve to replace reserves lost from deposit 
redemptions for gold and currency, even though the Fed had increased 
its discount rate from 1.5 percent to 3.5 percent. 4
The Fed made virtually no open-market purchases of government 
securities during the crisis. On February 24, 1932, the Fed's security 
portfolio was the same size that it had been on September 16, 1931, 
and thus open-market operations had contributed nothing toward off 
setting the gold and currency outflows. While increased discount-win 
dow borrowing offset these outflows somewhat, member bank total 
reserves still fell by $540 million, or 22 percent, between mid Septem 
ber and the end of February.
On the surface, the Fed's behavior in the fourth quarter of 1931 
appears inconsistent both with Benjamin Strong's policy guidelines 
and with appropriate lender of last resort policy. As Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963, pp. 315-322) describe, the Fed had acted to halt an 
"external drain" of reserves from the banking system (gold outflows), 
but not the "internal drain" (conversion of deposits into currency).
The Fed argued that it had not made open-market purchases during 
the crisis of 1931 because its own reserve position was in jeopardy.
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The Federal Reserve Banks were required to maintain gold reserves 
equal to 40 percent of their notes outstanding and 35 percent of their 
deposit liabilities (which consisted mainly of member bank reserve 
accounts). In addition, the Reserve Banks were required to hold collat 
eral in the form of gold or eligible securities against their note issues 
(gold held as reserves also counted as collateral). Finally, the Reserve 
Banks were required to deposit gold with the U.S. Treasury equal to at 
least 5 percent of their note issues that were collateralized by securi 
ties.
Securities eligible for use as collateral for Federal Reserve note 
issues included bankers acceptances and commercial notes the Reserve 
Banks had purchased or discounted for member banks, but not govern 
ment securities acquired in the open market. Thus, purchases of gov 
ernment securities increased Fed liabilities but did not add to the 
collateral backing them, and so the Fed had to hold excess reserves 
before it could engage in open-market purchases. 5
From July to October 1931, Federal Reserve Bank gold reserves 
declined from over 84 percent of Fed liabilities to 63 percent. 
Although the Fed still had sufficient gold to cover its gold reserve 
requirement, some of its excess gold reserve was used as collateral for 
Reserve Bank note issues. Consequently, the Fed's "free gold," i.e., the 
amount of gold not currently pledged as reserves or collateral, dwin 
dled.
In its 1932 Annual Report, the Federal Reserve Board implied that 
a lack of free gold reserves had kept it from purchasing government 
securities during the 1931 crisis, and it noted that large purchases had 
followed enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act of February 27, 1932, 
which had expanded the types of securities that were eligible for use as 
collateral for Fed liabilities to include U.S. government securities (see 
also the Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1932). Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963, pp. 399-406) contend that the Fed's claim that a lack 
of free gold had prevented open-market purchases was a ruse, though 
others, such as Epstein and Ferguson (1984, pp. 964-965) argue that 
Fed officials truly felt constrained by a lack of reserves.
Regardless of whether or not the Fed was constrained by its collat 
eral requirement, the System had another option—the Federal Reserve 
Board had the right to suspend the Fed's reserve requirements. I am 
aware of no evidence that the Fed considered suspension, however.
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Wicker (1966, pp. 169-170) argues that Fed officials feared that open- 
market purchases would exacerbate gold outflows by increasing doubt 
about the Fed's resolve to maintain the value of the dollar in terms of 
gold over the long run. Presumably these officials believed that sus 
pension of the Fed's reserve requirements would also cause gold out 
flows, and hence that a combination of suspension and open-market 
purchases was untenable.
DID THE FED FOLLOW GOLD STANDARD ORTHODOXY?
Fed officials believed strongly in preserving the gold standard, and 
at first glance their policy actions appear to have reflected gold stan 
dard doctrine. But, two aspects of policy—the Fed's delay in raising 
its discount rate following Britain's suspension of the gold standard, 
and the Fed's long-time policy of limiting the impact of gold flows on 
the domestic money supply—suggest otherwise.
Wicker (1996, pp. 86-94) argues that the gold standard played 
only a "minor" role in the discount rate increases of October 1931, cit 
ing the fact that the discount rate was not increased until two and one- 
half weeks after Britain suspended gold payments and the United 
States had experienced heavy gold outflows. As further evidence, he 
cites meeting records of the board of directors of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York in which George Harrison, Governor of the New 
York Fed, argued against raising rates in the wake of Britain's action 
and then buried defense of gold among other reasons when later advo 
cating a discount rate increase. Wicker argues that the Fed's policy 
was thus not a "knee-jerk" response to gold standard conventions.
Chandler (1971, p. 177) interprets the Fed's delay in raising its dis 
count rate somewhat differently. He argues that some Fed officials 
believed that a discount rate increase might suggest weakness and 
thereby exacerbate gold outflows, though fear that a rate increase 
might hurt the economy also played some part in the delay. Moreover, 
other Federal Reserve policymakers did press for an immediate dis 
count rate increase to defend the gold standard. Fed Governor Eugene 
Meyer, for example, argued that "an advance in the rate was called for 
by every known rule, and . . . foreigners would regard it as a lack of
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courage if the rate were not advanced" (quoted by Wicker 1996, p. 93). 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 383) cite a memorandum prepared 
for a meeting of the Fed's Open Market Committee in November 1931, 
which concluded that the "foreign and domestic drains upon bank 
reserves were met in the classic way by increases in the discount rate 
combined with a policy of free lending." Although disputing the 
memo's conclusion regarding the policy's efficacy, Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) agree that the Fed had sought to maintain the gold 
standard.
Besides the delay in raising the discount rate in 1931, the Fed's 
long-standing policy of limiting the impact of gold flows on the domes 
tic money stock also suggests that the Fed was not fully committed to 
the gold standard. Gold standard doctrine (the "rules of the game") 
held that gold inflows (outflows) should be permitted to increase 
(decrease) a country's money stock and price level so as to induce 
shifts in capital flows and the balance of trade that would limit future 
gold movements. 6 Since the early 1920s, however, the Fed had largely 
offset reserve fluctuations caused by flows of gold, currency, and other 
sources by varying the quantity of reserves supplied by open-market 
operations and discount-window lending. In essence, the Fed "steril 
ized" gold flows, as Benjamin Strong explained in 1926:
In the old days there was a direct relation between the coun 
try's stock of gold, bank deposits and the price level because 
bank deposits were . . . based on the stock of gold and bore a 
constant relationship to the gold stock . . . But in recent years 
the relationship between gold and bank deposits is no longer as 
close or direct . . . because the Federal Reserve System has 
given elasticity to the country's bank reserves . . . Federal 
Reserve bank credit is an elastic buffer between the country's 
gold supply and bank credit. (Strong 1926, p. 470)
Moreover, Strong credited the Fed with preventing inflation by offset 
ting gold inflows in 1921 and 1922:
As the flow of gold imports was pouring into the United States 
in 1921 and 1922, many economists abroad, and in this country 
as well, expected this inward flow of gold would result in a 
huge credit expansion and a serious price inflation. That no 
such expansion or inflation has taken place is due to the fact 
that the amount of Federal Reserve credit in use was dimin-
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ished as gold imports continued. Thus . . . the presence of the 
Reserve System may be said to have prevented rather than fos 
tered inflation. (Strong 1926, p. 471)
Although the Fed generally sterilized gold flows, it proved willing 
to deviate from that policy when it seemed necessary to protect the 
gold standard. The easing of monetary policy in 1924 and 1927 seems 
at least partly motivated by a desire to repel gold inflows and thereby 
assist Britain's ability to maintain gold reserves (Wicker 1966; Whee 
lock 1991). Moreover, when gold outflows reduced the Fed's reserve 
ratio in 1920-1921, the Fed increased its discount rate to 7 percent (a 
level not reached again until 1973) and endured a sharp deflation in 
order to preserve its gold reserve. This episode demonstrated the Fed's 
resolve to maintain its gold reserve and set the precedent for its policy 
in late 1931. Benjamin Strong may have "discovered" and actively 
used open-market policy, but he was unwilling to conduct policy out 
side the framework of the gold standard. He testified in 1928 that
When you are speaking of efforts simply to stabilize com 
merce, industry, agriculture, employment and so on, without 
regard to the penalties of violation of the gold standard, you 
are talking about human judgment and the management of 
prices which I do not believe in at all. (quoted by Burgess 
1930, p. 331)
Like Strong, Federal Reserve officials in 1931 viewed preservation 
of the gold standard as fundamental to long-run economic stability, and 
to preserve the gold standard for the long-term they were willing to 
undertake policies that might be destabilizing in the short run. Their 
response to the gold crisis of 1931 may have sealed the fate of Herbert 
Hoover and the Republicans in Congress, however, and ensured the 
election of politicians who would prove willing to change dramatically 
the institutions of monetary policymaking in the United States, includ 
ing the gold standard.
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES TO THE MONETARY 
POLICY REGIME
The year 1932 marked the beginning of a series of institutional 
reforms with potentially large consequences for monetary policy 
(Table 3). 7 Among the most significant were the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1932, which permitted the Federal Reserve to use government securi 
ties to back its note issues; suspension of the international gold stan 
dard by executive order on March 6, 1933 (ratified by Congress on 
March 9); the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1933, which, among other things, permitted the Federal Reserve to 
adjust commercial bank reserve requirements; the Gold Reserve Act of 
1934, which authorized the President to fix the dollar price of gold and 
established the Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund; and the Bank 
ing Act of 1935, which markedly altered the structure of the Federal 
Reserve System and expanded the Fed's authority to adjust reserve 
requirements.
By permitting U.S. government securities to serve as backing for 
Federal Reserve notes, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 removed an 
important constraint on discretionary monetary policy and enhanced 
the Fed's ability to initiate transactions that monetized government 
debt. 8 Although he lent his name to the enabling legislation, Carter 
Glass, who had sponsored the original Federal Reserve Act, apparently 
voiced considerable worry about the inflationary potential of permit 
ting government obligations to serve as collateral for Federal Reserve 
notes (Chandler 1971, p. 189). I argue below that Glass was prescient 
in his concerns.9
The next institutional change came when President Franklin 
Roosevelt suspended the gold standard upon taking office in March 
1933. Roosevelt was willing—perhaps forced—to take the step that 
Federal Reserve officials had so feared. As in other countries, eco 
nomic recovery followed suspension and thereby gave credibility to a 
regime of "managed money" (see Eichengreen 1992 or Temin 1989).
Using authority granted by the Gold Reserve Act of January 1934, 
Roosevelt fixed the value of gold at $35 per ounce (the previous level 
had been $20.67). Although the ownership of gold and its use for 
domestic payments remained prohibited, the United States returned to
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Table 3 Key Institutional Changes in Monetary Policy in the Early 1930s
1932 Glass-Steagall Act (February 27): temporarily made U.S.
government securities eligible collateral for Federal Reserve note 
issues, thereby expanding the Fed's ability to make open-market 
purchases (made permanent in 1933); also temporarily relaxed rules 
on discount-window lending (extended in 1933, made permanent in 
1935).
1933 Emergency Banking Act (March 9): ratified suspension of the gold 
standard.
Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act (May 12): 
authorized the Fed to set reserve requirements; gave the President 
authority to require open-market purchases by the Federal Reserve 
and to fix the weights of the gold and silver dollars.
Banking Act of 1933 (June 16): enhanced Federal Reserve Board 
control of discount-window lending; technical adjustments to Federal 
Reserve System organization.
1934 Gold Reserve Act (January 30): authorized transfer of monetary gold 
stock to the U.S. Treasury; amended the President's authority to fix 
the dollar prices of gold and silver; and established the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund.
Silver Purchase Act (June 19): authorized the President to purchase 
and nationalize monetary silver; authorized limited Federal Reserve 
lending to industrial and commercial firms.
1935 Banking Act of 1935 (August 23): reorganized Federal Reserve's
Open Market Committee and otherwise enhanced the authority of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System relative to the 
Federal Reserve Banks; extended Federal Reserve authority to adjust 
member bank reserve requirements.
The Economics of the Great Depression 143
the gold standard for the settlement of payments with other countries 
that also were on the gold standard. The restored gold standard, how 
ever, differed fundamentally from the previous standard in the degree 
to which its operation was removed from private markets and placed 
under control of government authorities. Americans were forbidden 
from holding gold, gold clauses in private contracts were made illegal, 
and the Treasury would sell gold only for making foreign payments.
Gold also was no longer regarded as an absolute exogenous check 
on government manipulation of the supply of money. Under the 
weight of the Great Depression, the ideology of the gold standard, 
which viewed gold as fundamental to a country's economic prosperity, 
had cracked. Although the dollar remained linked to gold, the link was 
weakened and, perhaps more important, government authorities had 
demonstrated a willingness to manipulate the gold standard to limit the 
extent to which it would interfere with discretionary monetary policy. 
Thereafter, when the Fed's gold reserve requirement threatened to limit 
money supply growth, the reserve requirements were reduced and ulti 
mately eliminated with apparently little debate or fanfare. The gold 
standard as it existed after 1933 was thus fundamentally different from 
its precursor and foreshadowed the Bretton Woods gold standard that 
was to replace it after World War II.
In addition to marking a fundamental shift in the degree to which 
gold served as a constraint on domestic monetary policy, the revalua 
tion of gold in 1934 left the U.S. Treasury with a capital gain of some 
$2.8 billion on its gold holdings. Under authority conveyed by the 
Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the Treasury used $2 billion of its windfall 
to establish the Exchange Stabilization Fund: "For the purpose of sta 
bilizing the exchange value of the dollar, the Secretary of the Treasury 
... is authorized ... to deal in gold and foreign exchange and such 
other instruments of credit and securities as he may deem necessary."
Although the operations of the Exchange Stabilization Fund during 
the 1930s had little effect on the quantity or growth of bank reserves, 
the size and open-ended authority of the Fund were widely viewed as a 
threat to the Federal Reserve System and its ability to effect monetary 
policy. For example, Roy Young, then Governor of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, argued that the Gold Reserve Act "gives the 
Secretary of the Treasury such powers, of a permanent nature, that he 
could nullify anything we [the Federal Reserve] could do" (quoted by
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Johnson 1939, p. 36). The Commercial and Financial Chronicle (Janu 
ary 20, 1934, p. 367) had a similar reaction: "The Reserve authorities 
have been reduced to shadowy nonentities, the Federal Reserve System 
having become simply an adjunct of the United States Treasury and the 
Federal Government, to do what they are told to do."
In addition to the Exchange Stabilization Fund, additional authori 
ties granted the President and Treasury Secretary included the right to 
"request" the Federal Reserve to use open-market purchases to 
increase bank reserves by up to $3 billion, and, if the Fed refused, to 
issue a commensurate amount of fiat currency. This power was granted 
by the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933, which, along with the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, also autho 
rized the purchase of silver and permitted the President to devalue the 
silver dollar. Between 1933 and 1938, the Treasury purchased 1.8 bil 
lion ounces of silver, thereby increasing bank reserves by $1 billion 
(some 20 percent of the total increase in reserves during the period). 
Had the President chosen to devalue the dollar in terms of silver, the 
Treasury would have reaped a $2.2 billion windfall on its silver hold 
ings (Johnson 1939, pp. 195-198). In summarizing the various new 
authorities given the administration, Johnson (1939, p. 202) concludes,
The President could double or triple bank reserves, had com 
plete discretion over the gold value—and consequently the for 
eign exchange value—of the dollar, and could establish 
bimetallism by proclamation, in other words, he could com 
pletely refashion the monetary system of the country, and the 
sole criteria required were his own subjective evaluations of the 
situation.
Organizational changes to the Federal Reserve System may have 
also contributed to the Fed's willingness to accept the administration's 
desired monetary policy. The authors of the Federal Reserve Act 
agreed that the Federal Reserve System should not be a "central bank" 
on the European model, but a federal system of semi-autonomous 
Reserve Banks with an overseeing board. Dissatisfaction with the sub 
sequent performance of the Federal Reserve, both during the 1920s and 
during the 1929-1933 period, led to reforms that enhanced the author 
ity of the Federal Reserve Board at the expense of the Reserve Banks. 
Marriner Eccles accepted the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve
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Board in 1933 with the understanding that he would have freedom to 
redesign the Federal Reserve System. His reforms included limits on 
the power of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which he viewed 
as an instrument of the private interests of New York bankers, and mea 
sures to ensure oversight and coordination of the activities of the 
regional Reserve Banks in pursuit of the national interest (Eccles 1966, 
pp. 170-172).
Under Eccles' plan, which was largely adopted by the Banking Act 
of 1935, the Board of Governors was given substantial control over 
open-market operations and Federal Reserve Bank discount rates. The 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was reconstituted to include 
all 7 members of the Board of Governors and just 5 of the 12 Reserve 
Bank presidents. 10 The legislation thereby increased the authority and 
stature of the Federal Reserve officials located in Washington and 
appointed by the President. On the other hand, it also sought to limit 
the influence of the President by removing the Secretary of the Trea 
sury and Comptroller of the Currency as ex officio FOMC members. 
With his reforms, Eccles intended that monetary policy making would 
be by professionals whose allegiance was solely to the national inter 
est. These changes, however, increased political pressures on the Fed 
at the same time that establishment of the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
and other measures increased the administration's power to conduct 
monetary policy. Consequently, these reforms shifted power away 
from the Fed toward the Treasury and promoted an inflation bias in 
monetary policy.
THE POSTWAR MONETARY REGIME
From 1933 to 1951, the Federal Reserve System was largely subor 
dinate to the Treasury in the conduct of monetary policy. The Fed 
increased reserve requirements in 1936 and 1937 to absorb some of the 
large volume of excess reserves that member banks had built up. A 
subsequent increase in government security yields angered Treasury 
officials, however, and the Fed was forced to make open-market pur 
chases and eventually reverse some of the change in reserve require 
ments.
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During World War II, the Fed agreed to prevent government secu 
rity yields from rising above predetermined levels. The Fed remained 
an instrument of debt management until 1951, when rising inflation 
caused Fed officials to argue for an independent monetary policy. 
Negotiations between the Fed and Treasury produced the Accord of 
March 1951, in which the Treasury agreed that the prices of govern 
ment securities should be permitted to find their market levels and the 
Fed agreed to be mindful of Treasury debt financing in carrying out its 
monetary policies. Tacitly, the Fed accepted stability of government 
securities prices as an objective of monetary policy. In particular, the 
Fed followed a policy known as "even keel," in which it limited fluctu 
ations in Treasury bill yields around Treasury issuing dates.
The Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 established the interna 
tional monetary regime under which the Fed operated in the postwar 
era. 11 From the end of World War II through 1958, international trade 
and capital movements took place to the extent permitted by exchange 
and capital controls, with international payments settled by means of 
bilateral agreements among countries. Early on, European countries 
ran large current account deficits, and the world suffered from a "dollar 
shortage." American economic strength and stability, along with the 
Marshall Plan and other cooperative efforts, caused the dollar to 
emerge as the key currency of the international payments system. As 
the 1950s progressed, Europe strengthened economically and several 
countries ran substantial current account surpluses. The main Western 
European currencies became convertible into dollars for current 
account transactions in 1959 (various capital controls remained). The 
United States, in turn, maintained convertibility of the dollar into gold 
at the fixed price of $35 per ounce. Bretton Woods was thus a gold- 
exchange standard, as its inter-war predecessor had been. However, 
the mechanism of dollar convertibility under Bretton Woods was fun 
damentally different from the mechanism of the pre-Great Depression 
gold standard, and the new mechanism explains how the United States 
could conduct an inflationary monetary policy while maintaining a 
fixed exchange rate between the dollar and gold.
Unlike the gold standard as it existed before 1933, under the Bret 
ton Woods System, the balance of payments could exert monetary dis 
cipline only to the extent permitted by central banks themselves. This 
mechanism reflected a fundamental shift in ideology, from one that
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saw maintaining gold convertibility as paramount for long-run prosper 
ity, to an ideology that viewed fixed exchange rates and gold convert 
ibility as desirable, but not so important as to sacrifice short-run 
economic stability in defense of the international system. Discretion 
ary monetary policy—"managed money"—was permitted under Bret- 
ton Woods to a degree never before achieved under a gold standard. 12
Under Bretton Woods, American balance of payments deficits (sur 
pluses) would be reflected in rising (falling) foreign central bank hold 
ings of U.S. dollars unless foreign central banks and the United States 
exchanged dollars for gold. Although foreign central banks could 
enforce monetary discipline on the United States, in practice they 
refrained from doing so until 1965, when the French began large-scale 
conversions of dollars into gold in the face of large and persisting 
American payments deficits. Throughout the 1960s, dollars held out 
side of the United States increased rapidly, while American gold 
reserves dwindled (Figure I). 13 The United States' commitment to 
gold convertibility thus became less and less credible. Numerous rem 
edies other than a substantial tightening of monetary policy were 
attempted to improve the U.S. payments deficit. But, without address 
ing the fundamental problem, the Bretton Woods System was destined 
to collapse, which it did when President Nixon closed the gold window 
on August 15, 1971. 14
AMERICAN INFLATION
The Bretton Woods System collapsed because the dollar shortage 
of the 1950s was replaced by a dollar glut in the 1960s. The Federal 
Reserve pursued a monetary policy that contained inflation throughout 
much of the decade following the Fed-Treasury Accord of March 1951. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, during the 1950s, the growth rate of Ml 
(which consists mainly of commercial bank demand deposits and cur 
rency held by the public) generally moved opposite to the rate of infla 
tion (as measured here by the Consumer Price Index). 15 Inflation 
control was not the sole objective of monetary policy during the 1950s, 
but it did generally coincide with the Fed's other objectives of limiting
Figure 1 Monetary Gold and Dollar Holdings, United States and the Rest of the World, 1945-1971






liabilities held by 
monetary authorities




45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71
Figure 2 Money Supply Growth and Inflation
M1 (annualized % change) 
8
CPI (annualized % change) 
8
1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971
150 Wheelock
fluctuations in national output and employment and preserving the sta 
bility of the government securities market.
The money supply growth rate began to accelerate in the early 
1960s and, by the mid 1960s, inflation had also begun to rise (Figure 
2). The desires of Fed officials to promote full employment and to sta 
bilize the yields on government securities explain the initial accelera 
tion of money growth. Fed officials remained committed to controlling 
inflation, however, and the accelerating inflation rate of the 1960s did 
not reflect a substantial change in the taste for inflation among Fed offi 
cials. Rather, the Fed stumbled into an inflationary policy as much 
because of flaws in its operating strategy as because of a desire to pur 
sue objectives other than inflation control.
The operating framework of Federal Reserve policy in the 1950s 
and 1960s was much like that which Benjamin Strong had described in 
the 1920s. That strategy was flawed because it permitted destabilizing 
fluctuations in the supply of money. I believe this helps explain why 
Fed officials were able to convince themselves that their policies were 
promoting recovery from the Depression when in fact they were per 
mitting a contractionary decline in the money stock (Wheelock 1991). 
Similarly, the Fed's use of this operating strategy in the 1960s explains 
how Fed officials could argue that policy was "leaning against the 
wind" of inflation despite accelerating money supply growth.
The Fed's policy strategy of the inter-war era, and its post-Accord 
reincarnation, focused on the levels of market interest rates and the net 
borrowed, or "free," reserves of commercial banks. Fed officials 
engaged in open-market operations to alter the level of free reserves, 
which equals the difference between reserves that banks hold in excess 
of legal requirements and reserves borrowed from the Fed's discount 
window. Through free reserves, the Fed sought to manipulate money 
market interest rates (Treasury bill yields in the early 1960s, the federal 
funds rate later on). Open-market purchases (sales) tend to add to 
(subtract from) the stock of free reserves, and an increase (decrease) in 
free reserves was viewed as an easing (tightening) of policy. In Figure 
3, the level of free reserves is plotted alongside the rate of inflation for 
the period from the Accord (March 1951) through December 1971. 
The Fed tended to reduce free reserves to combat increases in inflation 
and increase free reserves when inflation was declining. Thus, Fed 
officials sought to contract the level of free reserves in response to the
Figure 3 Inflation and Free Reserves
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generally rising rate of inflation of the 1960s. Because market interest 
rates tended to rise, Fed officials were further convinced that policy 
was tight.
Many economists, especially monetarists, criticized the Fed's pol 
icy strategy because of its tendency to exacerbate swings in money 
supply growth. 16 As illustrated in Figure 4, money supply growth 
accelerated throughout much of the 1960s, even as Fed officials ratch 
eted down the level of free reserves. The evidence therefore does not 
indicate that Fed officials lacked concern for inflation or failed to 
attempt to check the rising price level. Nevertheless, the Fed's policy 
permitted the money supply to rise at an inflationary rate.
The Federal Reserve was not powerless to halt the rising inflation, 
and Fed officials understood that inflation was contributing to the 
American balance of payments deficit and threatening the gold stan 
dard. Still, under the Bretton Woods System, U.S. policymakers did 
not have to make price stability the sole, or even primary, objective of 
monetary policy as long as other countries were willing to hold the 
growing supply of dollars available on world markets. Foreign central 
banks did forbear for a time, particularly since the dollar was the key 
currency of the international payments system. This gave the United 
States breathing room—not, as it turned out, to correct its balance of 
payments deficit, but to pursue other policy goals while inflation wors 
ened and the collapse of Bretton Woods became inevitable.
THE MONETARY POLICY LEGACY OF THE 
GREAT DEPRESSION
The Federal Reserve stumbled into an inflationary monetary policy 
in the early 1960s because, absent discipline exerted by balance of pay 
ments deficits, policymakers were able to pursue other objectives, 
namely employment growth and low interest rates on government debt. 
With its focus on free reserves and interest rates, the Fed's operating 
framework tended to cause money supply growth to accelerate at an 
inflationary pace as economic activity expanded. Because the Fed had 
used much the same operating framework before the Depression, this
Figure 4 Money Supply Growth and Free Reserves
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cause of inflationary policy during the 1960s was not a result of the 
Depression having occurred.
Keynesian Macroeconomics and Monetary Policymaking
Much of the "inflationary bias" in monetary policy during the 1960s 
can, however, be attributed to changed institutions and economic policy 
ideology caused by the Great Depression. Keynesian macroeconomics 
and its influence on economic policymaking was an important ideolog 
ical product of the Great Depression. The influence of Keynesian eco 
nomic ideas on policymaking during the 1960s has received 
considerable attention (e.g., DeLong 1995), with Lucas (1980, p. 704) 
writing that one of the "main features of the Keynesian Revolution and 
the neoclassical synthesis into which it evolved in the United States . . . 
[was] the onset of the Great Depression and the consequent shift of 
attention from explaining a recurrent pattern of ups and downs to 
explaining an economy apparently stuck in an interminable down."
Keynesian-oriented policymakers believed that monetary and fiscal 
policy could reliably increase aggregate demand and employment 
along a stable Phillips curve. Central to discussions of monetary pol 
icy among Federal Reserve officials was the perceived trade-off of 
unemployment and inflation. As Federal Reserve Governor Sherman 
Maisel explained it, "There is a trade-off between idle men and a more 
stable value for the dollar. A conscious decision must be made as to 
how much unemployment and loss of output must be made in order to 
get smaller price rises" (Maisel 1973, p. 14). Maisel added that "at 
least some of the Committee's differences on policy reflected differ 
ences in basic value judgments regarding the relative importance of 
various conflicting goals—for example, regarding the appropriate 
trade-off between employment and price stability" (FOMC Minutes, 
October 20, 1970, p. 41). 17
Maisel's views were widely shared among his colleagues, includ 
ing Arthur Burns, who became Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors in 1970. Burns consistently was among those favoring 
an easy monetary policy in 1970 and 1971 and often cited the conse 
quences of monetary policy for employment. At an FOMC meeting on 
March 9, 1971, for example, Maisel read a New York Times editorial to 
the effect that "anyone who was a party to the use of unemployment to
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combat inflation had a moral duty to lead the way, either by relinquish 
ing his job or by contributing his income to the support of the involun 
tarily unemployed." Burns replied that "he wanted to endorse Mr. 
MaiseFs . . . comments," that the ongoing economic recovery was 
"fragile" and that "rising [interest] rates could prove fatal to the pros 
pects for recovery" (FOMC Minutes, March 9, 1971, pp. 44-49). 18
To avoid confronting the inflation-unemployment trade-off, Burns, 
like many of his Fed colleagues, advocated wage and price controls so 
that monetary policy could focus on fighting unemployment. More 
over, Burns frequently argued that inflation associated with increases 
in wages and other production costs, as opposed to excessive monetary 
growth, should not be fought with tight monetary policy. At an FOMC 
meeting on June 8,1971, for example, he argued that "Monetary policy 
could do very little to arrest an inflation that rested so heavily on wage- 
cost pressures ... A much higher rate of unemployment produced by 
monetary policy would not moderate such pressures appreciably . . . 
He intended to continue to press [the administration] hard for an effec 
tive incomes policy" (FOMC Minutes, June 8,1971, p. 51). Burns and 
other Fed officials frequently argued that monetary policy could not 
effectively control inflation, but that fiscal policy and wage and price 
controls could better accomplish the task. Monetary policy, on the 
other hand, should prevent interest rates from rising and choking off 
economic growth. In arguing against a policy tightening in April 1971, 
Burns contended that any increase in long-term interest rates would 
slow the economy "and the nation might then enter on a long period of 
economic stagnation. The Federal Reserve could not permit that devel 
opment" (FOMC Minutes, April 6, 1971, p. 56).
During the 1960s and 1970s, Fed officials believed that policy 
actions to push down interest rates could promote output and employ 
ment growth. Such action would not necessarily cause inflation, they 
argued, and if it did, inflation was an acceptable cost of high employ 
ment. Moreover, wage and price controls could limit inflation. It is my 
view that Federal Reserve policymakers were no less concerned about 
the unemployed and the prospects for economic growth during the 
Great Depression. Their views about how monetary policy could be 
used to foster growth, however, were almost diametrically opposed to 
those of Fed officials in the 1960s and early 1970s.
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During the Depression, a common view among Fed officials was 
that pumping liquidity into the economy would only prolong the 
Depression by delaying the adjustments to wages and prices that they 
saw as necessary for a recovery to begin. One example of this point of 
view is evident in the comments of William McChesney Martin, Gov 
ernor of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis during the Depression 
and father of William McChesney Martin, Jr., the Federal Reserve 
Board's Chairman from 1951 to 1970. In early 1930, Martin argued,
I cannot see how the situation can be benefited by putting fifty 
millions of dollars, or, in fact, any other amount, into the gen 
eral market at this time . . . The reason that more money is not 
being used is because it is not needed, and when there is 
already sufficient money to meet the expressed needs, it seems 
to me unwise artificially to add to the amount already suffi 
cient . . . because based on a redundancy of money rather than 
on actual needs may be hazardous, (quoted by Chandler 1971, 
p. 142)
A similar view was expressed by George Norris, Governor of the Fed 
eral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia:
We believe that the correction must come about through 
reduced production, reduced inventories, the gradual reduction 
of consumer credit, the liquidation of security loans, and the 
accumulation of savings through the exercise of thrift . . . We 
have been putting out credit in a period of depression, when it 
was not wanted and could not be used, (quoted by Chandler 
1971, p. 137)
The Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, John 
Calkins, also argued against trying to stimulate the economy by lower 
ing interest rates: "With credit cheap and redundant we do not believe 
that business recovery will be accelerated by making credit cheaper 
and more redundant" (quoted by Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p. 372). 
The views of Martin, Norris, and Calkins were not atypical among 
Federal Reserve officials during the 1930s. Nor was it unusual for gov 
ernment officials outside of the Federal Reserve to hold similar views. 
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, for example, believed that 
the best medicine for the Depression was to "liquidate labor, liquidate 
stocks, liquidate the fanners, liquidate real estate . .. purge the rotten-
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ness out of the system" (quoted by Eichengreen 1992, p. 251). Such a 
prescription could hardly be called "Keynesian."
Political Pressures on the Fed
The macroeconomic model used by Federal Reserve officials dur 
ing the 1960s and 1970s was quite different from that used in the early 
1930s. So too was the extent to which the Federal Reserve was pres- 
sured by other government officials.
Although the Federal Reserve has never been a truly "indepen 
dent" central bank, certain institutional changes occurring as a result of 
the Great Depression subjected the Fed to greater political pressure, 
while at the same time increasing the opportunity for the Fed to mone 
tize fiscal deficits. Together these changes added an inflation bias to 
monetary policy.
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, as noted previously, permitted 
U.S. Government securities to serve as partial backing for Federal 
Reserve monetary liabilities. Thus monetization of fiscal deficits could 
occur even if the Fed held no excess gold or commercial paper 
reserves. In the 1930s, special authorities given by Congress to the 
President to fix the value of the dollar in terms of gold, to monetize sil 
ver, to buy and sell foreign exchange, and even to order the Federal 
Reserve to make open-market purchases, all weakened the Fed's abil 
ity to conduct an independent monetary policy. In addition, changes to 
the structure of the Federal Reserve System itself increased the con 
centration of power within the Fed in the hands of government appoin 
tees located in Washington.
Although the Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951 returned a measure of 
independence to the Fed, the level and stability of government security 
yields remained a key focus of monetary policy. Part of the explana 
tion for this focus may rest with the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The 
Fed had ensured plentiful and inexpensive funding for the Treasury 
during the two world wars, and the Fed may have sought to limit 
increases in government security yields during the Korean and Vietnam 
episodes out of a sense of patriotic duty. 19 A by-product of such a pol 
icy, of course, was a faster rate of increase in the supply of money.
New Deal changes to the Fed's internal structure may have also 
contributed toward its policy of limiting increases in interest rates. By
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reducing the role of Federal Reserve Bank presidents in favor of the 
Board of Governors, the Banking Act of 1935 subjected the Fed to 
greater political influence by concentrating power in the hands of 
Washington-based officials who are presidential appointees. Political 
influence on monetary policy has been the subject of extensive study 
(e.g., Woolley 1984; Havrilesky 1993), and a general conclusion seems 
to be that the short, finite horizon of political election cycles gives pol 
iticians an incentive to favor more expansionary monetary policies than 
does the public as a whole. To the extent that politicians are able to get 
the monetary policy they desire, the result is a higher long-run rate of 
inflation than would otherwise occur. Thus, countries with less inde 
pendent central banks tend to have higher inflation rates than countries 
with relatively independent central banks.
An infamous example of Federal Reserve acquiescence to political 
pressure came in 1972, when at the request of the administration 
Arthur Burns was alleged to have increased the money supply growth 
rate to promote President Nixon's reelection (see Wells 1994 for dis 
cussion). Whether or not such overt pressure was exerted, it is clear 
that under both Burns and Martin political considerations influenced 
the setting of monetary policy. With the possible exception of Nixon's 
reelection, such pressure was not overtly connected to elections, but 
rather to consideration of the administration's or Congress' policy 
preferences. To the extent such considerations influenced policy out 
comes, they would almost always have done so on the side of promot 
ing inflation.20
Monetary Policy and the Balance of Payments
The Fed's operating strategy, desire to promote high employment, 
and pressures on the Fed to keep interest rates low all gave monetary 
policy a bias toward inflation. By themselves, however, they could not 
have resulted in a sustained inflation without an accommodating inter 
national monetary regime. Under the classical gold standard, for 
example, an inflationary monetary policy could not have been sus 
tained. But, under Bretton Woods, sustained inflation was possible as 
long as foreign central banks were willing to hold the dollars they 
accumulated as a result of the American payments deficit, rather than 
demand payment in gold for those dollars.
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Although the Bretton Woods System provided some insulation for 
discretionary monetary policy, Federal Reserve officials understood 
that the United States could not run a balance of payments deficit 
indefinitely. But, Fed officials were also wary of combating a balance 
of payments deficit with policies that might interfere with other goals. 
On one occasion, President Alfred Hayes of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, argued that "I would think it unwise to let the gold out 
flow itself affect our monetary policy directly, i.e., in the way of using 
a tightening move directed specifically toward stemming the flow and 
unrelated to domestic economic developments" (FOMC Minutes, 
November 10, 1958, pp. 14-15). Another time, a Reserve Bank presi 
dent expressed concern about the balance of payments deficit but was 
reluctant to advocate a tighter policy for fear of disrupting the market 
for government securities: "Generally, he felt that the course of mone 
tary policy should be moving toward a more restrictive posture. At the 
same time, he was quite concerned about the rate picture in the govern 
ment securities market and the problems facing the Treasury in the 
future" (FOMC Minutes, May 5, 1959, p. 34). This reluctance to face 
squarely gold outflows and a balance of payments deficit stands in 
marked contrast to the Fed's reaction to gold outflows in 1931. At that 
time, Fed officials agreed that maintaining convertibility of the dollar 
into gold at a constant price was fundamental to long-run economic 
stability, and they were willing to tighten monetary policy in the mid 
dle of a depression to preserve the international monetary regime. By 
contrast, in the 1950s and 1960s, Fed officials viewed the balance of 
payments with concern but were hesitant to make it the sole, or even 
the primary, focus of policy. This change in philosophy, attaching less 
importance to the gold standard rule and more to discretionary policy, 
was an important legacy of the Great Depression.
Although Fed officials were unwilling to tighten sufficiently to 
arrest the balance of payments deficit, they did see the deficit as influ 
encing their ability to promote domestic economic activity. Chairman 
Martin, for example, argued that "If the Federal Reserve got the reputa 
tion of following a cheap money policy just for the sake of doing so, 
people abroad would be encouraged to think the System was not con 
cerned with the balance of payments or the soundness of the dollar" 
(FOMC Minutes, December 13, 1960, p. 40). Martin also argued that 
"The balance of payments problem . . . was a vital factor in the unem-
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ployment situation. Foreign capital was finding the United States less 
and less attractive, there were pressures for movement of capital 
abroad, and this was having a deleterious effect on employment in this 
country" (FOMC Minutes, March 6, 1962, p. 56).
Fed officials also understood that the balance of payments deficit 
stemmed from differences in the macroeconomic policies of different 
countries. At an FOMC meeting in 1959, a Fed staff member reported 
that "the net result of attempts in this country to validate our wage and 
price policies through monetary expansion could succeed only if we 
could inflate the whole world." The staff member went on to argue that 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy could "price United States' 
goods out of world markets" because officials of other countries, nota 
bly Germany and the Netherlands, surely would not permit inflation in 
their domestic prices (FOMC Minutes, May 5, 1959, p. 14). The same 
official, however, was unwilling to blame monetary policy alone for the 
balance of payments deficit. In arguing that gold outflows "call for a 
generally restrictive credit policy . . . more effective corrections . . . 
would be moves to reduce the budgetary deficit and the checking of 
price rises due to wage and other cost increases" (FOMC Minutes, 
October 21, 1958).
The Fed's unwillingness to tighten sufficiently to stem the balance 
of payments deficit led it to consider other actions it might take. One 
of the earliest of the policies intended to restore external balance was 
"Operation Twist"—an attempt to raise short-term interest rates high 
enough to attract foreign capital while keeping long-term interest rates 
low enough to favor domestic expansion.
Other policies intended to correct international payments imbal 
ances without slowing domestic activity included agreements with for 
eign central banks to forbear from demanding gold, intervention in 
foreign exchange markets, the issuance of foreign-currency-denomi 
nated U.S. bonds ("Roosa bonds"), requests of early repayment by for 
eign governments of debts to the U.S. government, the removal of 
interest rate ceilings on U.S. bank time deposits, capital outflow con 
straints imposed in the United States, and changes in U.S. tax treat 
ment of foreign earnings. Balance of payments deficits continued, 
however, and the long-term feasibility of the existing dollar gold- 
exchange standard grew increasingly doubtful.
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THE COLLAPSE OF BRETTON WOODS
When Arthur Burns took over as chairman of the Fed's Board of 
Governors in early 1970, the U.S. economy was sliding toward a reces 
sion, the inflation rate stood at 6.5 percent (first-quarter average annu- 
alized rate of CPI inflation), and the U.S. balance of payments had 
been in deficit nearly every year since the late 1950s. At his first meet 
ing, Burns announced that "in his judgment, economic developments 
had reached a point at which a rethinking of monetary policy was in 
order" (FOMC Minutes, February 10, 1970, p. 3). It quickly became 
apparent that Burns would make avoidance of a recession his first pri 
ority. Against three dissents, the Federal Open Market Committee 
voted to ease monetary policy at that meeting. One of the dissenting 
votes came from Andrew Brimmer, who expressed the hope that "the 
Committee would not lose sight of the highly unfavorable outlook for 
the balance of payments and would give the payments balance some 
what greater than customary weight in formulating policy over the near 
term" (FOMC Minutes, February 10, 1970, p. 59).
Federal Open Market Committee meetings usually begin with 
analysis of economic conditions by Fed staff members, and during 
1970 and 1971, the staff frequently expressed pessimism about the bal 
ance of payments deficit. Following the staff reports, there usually was 
a report from a Fed governor, often Dewey Daane, who attended a reg 
ular meeting of central bank officials in Europe. The U.S. payments 
deficit was a principal topic at those meetings, with the Europeans fre 
quently questioning American resolve to control inflation (see, e.g., 
FOMC Minutes, June 23, 1970). The balance of payments seems to 
have had limited impact on FOMC deliberations, however, because 
after hearing the summary of the European meeting, the Committee 
would review domestic economic conditions and discuss the policy 
directive, usually with little or no reference to the balance of payments.
At the FOMC meeting of October 20, 1970, the Fed staff gave a 
particularly lengthy and pessimistic report on the balance of payment. 
Following the report, Burns "said he could add one word of reassur 
ance. Work on the balance of payments problem was going forward 
actively, and he was confident that adequate measures for grappling 
with the problem could be devised" (FOMC Minutes, October 20,
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1970, p. 21). From this comment, it is clear that Burns viewed the bal 
ance of payments deficit as a problem that could be controlled effec 
tively without monetary policy action. Moreover, the comment reflects 
the fact that the Treasury, especially Undersecretary Paul Volcker, was 
taking the lead in devising America's international economic policy.
Despite the seeming lack of influence of the balance of payments 
deficit on Federal Reserve policy, some of the Fed's staff, as well as the 
occasional governor, warned about the worsening payments deficit. At 
an FOMC meeting on June 23,1970, the first vice president of the New 
York Fed argued that "a convincing and sustained attack on domestic 
inflation remains essential for improving our balance of payments and 
strengthening confidence in the dollar" (FOMC Minutes, June 23, 
1970, p. 57). On another occasion, Alfred Hayes, president of the New 
York Fed noted that "a stiff price is being paid for the easing of money 
market conditions in the United States . . . International conditions 
underline the need for giving high priority to the inflation problem" 
(FOMC Minutes, September 15, 1970, pp. 43-44). But, Governor 
Maisel replied that
It would be improper to assume that balance of payments con 
siderations should be a constraint on [policy]. If the balance of 
payments remained unsatisfactory with demand still far below 
normal, that would appear to be an indication of basic struc 
tural problems in the balance of payments sphere. The Com 
mittee should be working to correct those structural imbalances 
rather than assuming a posture which traded off losses of 
income, output, and jobs in an attempt to offset basic structural 
defects in the balance of payments sphere. (FOMC Minutes, 
September 15, 1970, p. 46)
Arthur Burns added that "he believed that balance of payments consid 
erations should not prevent the Committee from taking the policy 
actions it felt required by the domestic economy" (FOMC Minutes, 
September 15, 1970, p. 65). Later in the same meeting Burns advo 
cated "special measures," presumably capital controls or similar mea 
sures, to deal with the balance of payments deficit (FOMC Minutes, 
September 15, 1970, p. 81). Burns reiterated this view on February 9, 
1971: "Chairman Burns commented that while the System was faced 
with international as well as domestic problems, the latter were the
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more pressing. Moreover, special tools were available for dealing with 
the former" (FOMC Minutes, February 9, 1971, p. 92).
The balance of payments deficit grew increasingly worse in early 
1971, and the Fed staff warnings became stronger. At the March 
FOMC meeting, a Fed staff member warned that "Sooner or later—and 
he suspected that it would be sooner—the central bank complaints now 
being voiced privately [about their build-up of dollar balances] would 
become known to the market, which might then decide to protect itself 
against the risk of a sudden break in the structure of exchange parities" 
(FOMC Minutes, March 9, 1971, p. 22). Another staff member 
reported that
1) the balance of payments deficit in the first two months of 
this year was enormous; [and] 2) the monetary aggregates have 
been growing very rapidly. What connects these two sets of 
facts is the very steep decline in short-term interest rates. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the short-term capital outflow has 
been extremely large . . . Considerable reluctance has been 
built up abroad, especially among financial officials in Europe, 
over what they regard as an undermining of their own mone 
tary policies resulting from the massive short-term capital out 
flows from the United States and from the steep decline in 
short-term rates. The impression exists that . . . the United 
States has completely ignored the effects its policies are having 
on the rest of the world. (FOMC Minutes, March 9, 1970, pp. 
28-29)
As the year 1971 progressed, the international payments crisis 
worsened. At the FOMC meeting of May 11, New York Fed president 
Hayes remarked that "We are ... in the midst of an international mon 
etary crisis ... A vote of no confidence in the dollar has been taken by 
several central banks" (FOMC Minutes, May 11, 1971, p. 53). Hayes 
also reported that the directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York had voted to increase the Bank's discount rate by one-half point, 
the same step taken in response to a flight from the dollar in October 
1931:
The directors felt in this major international crisis there was 
nothing the System could do that would be more useful and 
more timely than to give an overt signal of our concern and our 
willingness to move quickly toward narrowing the interest rate
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spread which was a major cause of the difficulty .. . While rec 
ognizing the risks involved in a general increase in domestic 
interest rates, they felt that those risks were outweighed by 
international conditions. (FOMC Minutes, May 11, 1971, pp.
55-56)
The Board of Governors turned down the New York Bank's request 
for a discount rate increase, citing weakness in the domestic economy, 
the adverse effects of higher interest rates on the mortgage market and 
the market for state and local government debt, and the likely instabil 
ity that a discount rate hike would cause in all financial markets. At the 
prior FOMC meeting, Burns seems to have predicted the New York 
Bank's request for a discount rate increase when he relayed that "he 
had a vivid recollection of developments in 1931, when the Federal 
Reserve had raised its discount rate and acted to stiffen short-term rates 
because of a balance of payments problem, and an incipient [domestic 
economic] recovery had been cut off" (FOMC Minutes, April 6, 1971, 
p. 56). For Burns, the lesson of 1931 was to put the domestic economy 
first, ahead of the balance of payments and preservation of the gold 
standard.
CONCLUSION
The failures of economic policy, especially monetary policy, dur 
ing the Great Depression produced several significant institutional and 
ideological changes in the monetary policy regime. Not surprisingly, 
because monetary policy was associated with deflation and contraction 
during the period 1929-1933, the new regime included features that 
gave policy an inflation bias. Those features included both a new ave 
nue for monetizing government debt and increased political control of 
Federal Reserve policy. The Great Depression also put the new eco 
nomics of Keynes, with its emphasis on government management of 
aggregate demand, into the professional and policy mainstream.
The most fundamental legacy of the Great Depression for mone 
tary policy, however, concerned the international gold standard. 
Although governments interfered with the operation of the gold stan 
dard before 1933, and an unsettled question among economic histori-
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ans is the extent to which a laissez-faire gold standard would have 
proved more stable, a key lesson taken from the Great Depression was 
that the international monetary system required active management of 
government officials. Faith that the gold standard would ensure pros 
perity was destroyed, as was any notion that a disaster worse than the 
Depression would result if the gold standard was abandoned. Begin 
ning in 1933, and continuing at least to the 1970s, the dominant ideol 
ogy was that a gold standard and fixed exchange rates are desirable but 
not worth sacrificing high employment to maintain. This change in 
attitude, and the institutional changes accompanying it, largely 
explains the inflationary monetary policy of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
as well as the decision to abandon gold and fixed exchange rates in 
1971-1973.
Since the 1970s, the pendulum has swung away from inflationary 
monetary policy somewhat. The costs of high inflation and the seem 
ing inability of aggregate demand policy to maintain full employment 
helped promote New Classical macroeconomics and caused a rethink 
ing of the appropriate goals of monetary policy among government 
officials. Several countries now specify inflation targets for their cen 
tral banks and have formally adopted price stability as the paramount 
objective for monetary policy. The institutional environment of mone 
tary policy in the United States, however, has not changed since 1973, 
when fixed exchange rates were abandoned. The legacy of the Great 
Depression for monetary policy was in causing an institutional and 
ideological shift to a managed, discretionary monetary regime. The 
fundamentals of this regime remain in place today.
Notes
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect official positions of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.
1. Calomiris and Wheelock (1997) examine institutional changes to U.S. monetary 
policymaking resulting from the Great Depression and argue that those affecting 
the gold standard were the most important. That paper focuses on Federal 
Reserve policy during 1933-1941 in particular and during the 1950s and 1960s 
generally. By contrast, this paper examines in much greater detail the policy 
record leading up to suspension of gold payments in 1971 and how it compares 
with Federal Reserve policy during the Great Depression.
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2. Wheelock (1991) presents econometric estimates of the Federal Reserve "reaction 
function" for 1924—1929. Simulations of this function also illustrate that the Fed 
made fewer open-market purchases and cut its discount rate less during 1929— 
1931 than it would have done under the pre-1929 reaction function. But, as dis 
cussed below, this does not necessarily imply that the policy regime, i.e., the Fed's 
objectives or strategy, had changed.
3. The use of open-market operations for objectives other than to secure earning 
assets evolved in the early 1920s, but their use to manipulate instruments or oper 
ating targets, such as borrowed reserves, evolved only gradually as the Fed gained 
experience. Well into the Depression, the directions to the Fed's trading desk 
from the Open Market Committee specified the dollar amounts of securities the 
desk was authorized to buy or sell. By 1932, however, discussion at Open Market 
Committee meetings turned more toward the desired level of excess reserves and 
focused less on the specific dollar volume of securities to buy or sell. Later in the 
1930s, the Committee targeted yields on Treasury securities, as well as excess 
reserves.
4. This refers to the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. By 
December, the discount rates of all 12 Reserve Banks were at 3.5 percent or 
higher. The Fed also augmented bank reserves by purchasing bankers acceptan 
ces from member banks. The Fed purchased all eligible acceptances offered by 
banks but, as with its discount rate, the Fed increased the interest rate at which it 
made these purchases.
5. Whereas Fed holdings of government securities could not serve as collateral, dis 
count-window loans always produced collateral, including those secured by com 
mercial bank holdings of government securities.
6. See Eichengreen (1992) or Temin (1989) for detail about the operation of the 
international gold standard and its role in the Great Depression.
7. This section draws heavily on Calomiris and Wheelock (1997), where additional 
detail can be found.
8. During World War I, the Fed lent reserves to banks against their holdings of U.S. 
government securities at a discount rate that guaranteed banks a profit on their 
security holdings. This also had the effect of monetizing government debt.
9. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 was originally set to expire after one year, but it 
was made permanent in 1933. It should not be confused with the Banking Act of 
1933 which, among other things, established Federal deposit insurance, separated 
commercial and investment banking, and outlawed the payment of interest on 
demand deposits. The Banking Act of 1933 is also sometimes referred to as the 
Glass-Steagall Act.
10. The Banking Act of 1935 also changed the titles of the chief executive officers of 
the Federal Reserve Banks from the more prestigious "Governor" to "President," 
while discontinuing the Federal Reserve Board in favor of the Board of Gover 
nors, whose members all held the title "Governor." The Board of Governors was 
also authorized to approve the appointments of Federal Reserve Bank presidents 
and first vice presidents and to generally supervise Reserve Bank operations.
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11. See Bordo (1993) or Solomon (1977) for a history of the Bretton Woods System, 
and Meltzer (1991) for more specific analysis of U.S. economic policy under 
Bretton Woods.
12. Redish (1993) argues that Bretton Woods represented just one of a series of steps 
away from a gold standard operated solely by private markets, with little or no 
government interference, to a fiat monetary regime. As noted above, under the 
inter-war gold-exchange standard, the Federal Reserve (and other central banks) 
sterilized gold flows and used open-market operations and discount rate policy to 
manipulate gold flows.
13. The data sources for Figure 1 are The Role of Gold in the Domestic and Interna 
tional Monetary Systems: Report to the Congress of the Commission on the Role 
of Gold in the Domestic and International Monetary Systems, Volume 1, Table 
SC-10, column 3 (U.S. monetary gold stock) and Table SC-8, columns 1 and 2 
(world monetary gold stock), and International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics Supplement, 1972, pp. 2-3, rows 4 and 4a (U.S. external lia 
bilities).
14. A system of fixed exchange rates was imposed by the Smithsonian Agreement in 
1972, but this system collapsed in 1973, and the dollar has since floated. Since 
my interest here concerns the end of dollar convertibility into gold, I treat August 
15, 1971, as the date at which the Bretton Woods regime ended.
15. All series in Figures 2 to 4 are smoothed using a centered 13-month moving aver 
age filter.
16. Meigs (1962) and Brunner and Meltzer (1964) were among the earliest critics of 
the Fed's free reserves strategy.
17. The Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee are not verbatim transcrip 
tions of FOMC meetings. They do appear to give a reasonably full account of the 
discussion, however, and attribute comments to individuals by name.
18. See Wells (1994) for analysis of Burns' views.
19. Evidence of this is given in Calomiris and Wheelock (1997).
20. Burns had a close relationship with Nixon and clearly understood the monetary 
policy desired by the administration. Two examples of the interjection of political 
considerations into monetary policy discussions occurred at a meeting of the 
FOMC in October 1970 and January 1971. On the first occasion, Burns suggested 
that committee members consider the "judgments of members of Congress, senior 
officials of the Administration, and others" when attempting to determine how 
high they were willing to let the unemployment rate rise in fighting inflation 
(FOMC Minutes, October 20, 1970, p. 41). Three meetings later, Burns told the 
committee that "the Administration's confidence in the System was weakening as 
a result of the shortfalls that had occurred in the rates of money growth . . . The 
credibility of the Federal Reserve would be greatly strengthened if it became 
apparent that the Committee was seeking to make up the ... shortfall" (FOMC 
Minutes, January 12, 1971, p. 37). See Calomiris and Wheelock (1997) for exam 
ples of political pressure on the Fed when William Martin was Fed chairman.
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